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Abstract
Current research suggests that there are differences in the moral foundations of liberals
and conservatives. Liberals’ moral foundations tend to focus on issues of fairness,
equality, and social justice while conservatives’ focus on issues of authority, purity, and
social order. Framing political issues in the context of moral foundations such as harm or
purity can cause a change in political attitudes. The current study examines whether
framing issues in the context of harm or purity affects approach (social justice, selfreliance) and avoidance (social order, self-restraint) moral motives, and examines the role
of high activation negative emotions in this process. It was expected that framing issues
using the harm foundation, would increase social justice motives, especially among
conservatives. Results showed that when political issues were framed to induce feelings
of causing or avoiding harm, conservatives showed more motivation toward social justice
concerns. In contrast, framing had no effect on the social justice motives of liberals. High
activation negative emotions played no role in this relationship. Also, framing had no
effect on self-reliance, social order, or self-restraint motives among conservatives or
liberals. These results suggest that conservatives’ social justice motives can be increased
by framing political issues to induce feelings of causing or avoiding harm. This could be
a consideration when developing political communication strategies to promote social
justice motives.
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Framing and Moral Motives: The Interaction Between Moral Foundations and Ideology
in Predicting Motives
Morality sometimes enters into political decisions. This reality has become a
focus of study in political psychology. The 2004 reelection campaign of President George
W. Bush centered on the opposition of marriage equality for the LGBT community.
Some would argue that this strategy of emphasizing this moral issues increased
conservative turnout, giving the President a second term (Graeber, 2011; Janoff-Bulman,
Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008). There is currently a renewed focus on the so-called “culture
wars” in American politics. The issues of gender and LGBT equality were campaign
issues in the 2016 election. Additionally, since 2010, 32 states have enacted laws
restricting abortion. (Reid, 2012). Such morality-linked political controversies have led to
a new interest in the ways in which morality drives political attitudes. In the 2016
election cycle, candidates once again debated the moral issues of social and economic
inequality, abortion, gender, and marriage equality.
Research on morality and political behavior has traditionally focused on
understanding voting behavior. Recently, there has been a shift in focus from voting
behavior to better understanding political attitudes. Current research in the field seeks to
understand the extent to which framing political issues in the context of morality can lead
to a shift in political attitudes. The purpose of this study is to expand on existing research
on framing, morality, and political attitudes by examining whether framing political
issues in the context of morality can affect moral motivation. Specifically, this study tests
whether social justice motives can be primed by altering the moral framing of a political
issue and the role of political identity in this process.
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What is Morality?
Though morality has been a topic of discussion since the time of ancient
philosophers, David Hume (1738/1978) put forth one of the first treatises discussing the
origins and functions of moral sense and reasoning. Hume’s moral philosophy was based
on the theory of mind. Theory of mind describes an individual’s ability to interpret
other’s feelings, beliefs, and motives in relation to the self. Hume applied this philosophy
to ethics, producing four ethical theses: 1. Reason alone cannot act as a motive. Reason is
a “slave of the passions”. 2. Moral reasoning is not the result of reason. 3. Moral
reasoning is a result of moral sentiments. 4. Some virtues and vices are innate while
others, such as social justice and equality, are the result of culture (Cohon, 2010).
Contemporary moral theorists have used Hume’s moral philosophy to develop a number
of perspectives on morality.
Though there are a number of current theories of morality, they tend to take one
of three perspectives. One perspective argues that moral sense is innate and universal.
According to this approach, known as moral sense theory, moral sense can be defined as
a “code of values and customs which informs social conduct” (Marazzeti, et.al, 2013,
p.3). Morality is understood as the result of a deliberative, cognitive process and that it is
innate, universal, and unchangeable. Moral rules regarding fairness, not causing harm to
others, and cultural purity are seen as innate and are understood to exist across all
cultures. For example, children automatically know at an early age that hitting another
will cause bodily harm and that they should avoid such behavior (Turiel, 1983). There is
a contradiction in this perspective. How can morality be both deliberative and innate?
This contradiction is addressed in later theories.
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A second perspective takes into account the role of acculturation and socialization
in the development of moral sense. This perspective argues that morality is developed
throughout childhood as the result of social learning and is distinct from other forms of
social knowledge. Individuals develop basic rules regarding fairness, welfare, and the
rights of others throughout early childhood. The knowledge of the rules will become
stable by late adolescence (Gilligan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983).
A third perspective takes into account the role of emotion in moral reasoning.
This perspective argues that moral reasoning, motives, and judgements result primarily
from emotions. Judgments regarding moral issues are often the result of emotional
reactions to a behavior or situation. When confronting a behavior that may be perceived
as taboo, individuals may first have an emotional reaction to the behavior. From that
emotional response they make a judgment and then rationalize their judgment. These
taboos are typically learned as the result of socialization and are based on cultural norms.
For example, an individual may notice a same-sex couple expressing affection in public.
In certain cultures this could be considered a taboo behavior. A negative emotional
reaction to this violation could lead to a negative moral judgement based on an emotional
reaction (Bloom, 2014; Hume, 1739/1978; Haidt, 2001). Haidt (2012) refers to this
process as moral dumbfounding. Specifically, violations of harmless taboos will often be
judged as wrong due to the emotions they elicit, with cognitive appraisal occurring at the
end of the process. He uses the phrase “I know it’s wrong but I don’t know why” to
describe this phenomenon (Haidt, 2012). Overall, this perspective argues that emotional
reactions precede moral judgments.
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The three approaches mentioned above do conflict and can be better explained
through the theory of moral sense. The theory of moral sense combines these previous
approaches and also seeks to address the earlier contradiction of morality being both
deliberative and innate. As stated earlier, moral sense drives social conduct and can be
thought of as either “descriptive” or “normative”. Descriptive morality includes the codes
established by society that help to establish rules for what is right and what is wrong.
While this code is guided by social norms and is meant to prevent and regulate rules
regarding the harm of others, its primary focus is the acceptance of authority and respect
for group rules. In other words, descriptive morality guides individuals by providing the
rules needed to ensure cohesion of social groups. Normative morality, on the other hand,
considers the codes followed by all individuals despite any formal rules set by society or
the group. This code of morality is considered universal and specifically focuses on
fairness and the prevention of harm of others. There is some overlap between descriptive
and normative morality and the three previously mentioned approaches. Normative
morality, specifically, is consistent with the idea that morality is innate and universal.
Moral sense also takes into account the role emotions play in morality. Specifically,
descriptions of moral sense suggest that because of the ability to experience a wide range
of emotions, humans have developed of a sense of morality that does not appear to be
present in other animal species (Marazziti, et. al, 2013). In general, moral sense describes
the extent to which morality can be both innate and learned and takes into account the
role of emotions in moral judgments.
Haidt and Graham (2007) applied these previous theories in moral psychology to
develop Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). Like other perspectives, MFT describes
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moral intuitions as innate dispositions that are derived from cultural practices and
intuitions. All humans are born with basic intuitions but they are further developed and
changed through childhood dependent on cultural socialization. For example, Haidt and
Graham argue that all humans innately attempt to avoid causing physical harm to others
but the rules for avoiding such harm are learned. Humans are born with a sense of right
and wrong, but the rules for how we should treat others are learned throughout the course
of development.
Also taking other theories into account, MFT suggests that these dispositions are
malleable and can change depending on context. Through an examination of
psychological, anthropological, and evolutionary literature Haidt and Graham categorized
morality into five foundations which fall within two domains. The individualizing
foundations include the facets of fairness/reciprocity and harm/care. For simplicity, these
will be referred to as fairness and harm. These individualizing foundations state that
moral choices are the result of a careful examination of the rights of individuals and the
amount of harm that will come to those individuals. When these ethics are taken into
consideration individuals will often make a choice that results in the least amount of harm
to the fewest individuals (Gilligan, 1982; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Kohlberg, 1969). In
contrast to the individualizing foundations, the binding foundations are characterized by
group loyalty. The binding foundation includes the facets of ingroup/loyalty,
authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. For simplicity, these will be referred to as ingroup,
authority, and purity. Haidt and Graham argue that it is the binding foundations, in
particular, that promote the strength of identification and unity with social groups. For
example, an individual who has binding moral foundations will likely show a strong
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preference for ingroup membership, respect for authority, and the maintenance of
traditional values (Haidt & Graham, 2007). In general, MFT seeks to consolidate
previous perspectives on morality into one framework. This framework takes into
account both the innate and malleable nature of morality while also acknowledging the
role of emotion in the process of moral judgments.
Emotion, Moral Motives, and Political Triggers
A common thread in most theories of morality is that of the role of emotions in
moral reasoning. Russell (1980) described a circumplex model of emotion. This model
suggests that emotions are either pleasant or unpleasant, can be activating or deactivating,
and are the result of a cognitive processing of neural stimuli. It is these stimuli that lead
to the motivation to act (Posner, Russell, and Peterson, 2005; Russell, 1980). When
considering morality, emotions typically discussed include disgust, anger, and fear.
Disgust is often linked with the purity while anger and fear are linked with the
authority/respect and ingroup binding foundations (Bloom, 2014). These are all
consistent with the activating emotions described in the circumplex model. Though the
circumplex model also includes positive emotions, negative emotions are the focus of the
current study. This approach was taken because most research on moral reasoning and the
emotions associated with morality centers on negative emotions.
Bloom (2014) investigated the role of emotion in moral judgments in an
experimental setting. She argued that moral judgments consist of both an emotional and a
cognitive component. Her research on moral emotions examines whether emotion and
cognition are complimentary processes in the formation of moral judgments. To
investigate this hypothesis, she first exposed participants to a narrative that was meant to
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induce feelings of harm or disgust. Next, participants indicated support for self- or otherdirected negative emotions toward same-sex marriage. Specifically, consistent with the
circumplex model, she considered whether inductions of high activation negative
emotions would affect moral judgments. Results showed that participants primed with
feelings of harm and disgust expressed both self- and other-directed negative emotions
and made more harsh moral judgements (Bloom, 2014).
When examining the influence of emotions on morality, Haidt and Greene (2002)
describe the theory of the emotionalist (Haidt & Greene, 2002). This theory states that
moral judgment is more influenced by emotion than by cognitive reasoning. Haidt (2001)
further describes the emotions that may affect moral reasoning, including both high
activation emotions, such as anger and disgust, and low activation emotions, such as guilt
and shame (Haidt, 2001; Posner, Russell, and Peterson, 2005; Russell, 1980). Political
issues can often activate moral motives by inducing an emotional response. Haidt (2012)
discusses the ways in which emotion and morality can work as political triggers. In this
case, political issues may produce moral emotions which will then trigger moral motives.
For example, a political advertisement showing an individual preparing to kill an animal
may cause negative emotions, such as frustration, sadness, disgust, and anger, which
would arouse concerns over harm. This process would influence moral judgment and is
illustrated in Figure 1. This emotional reaction could induce the motivation for an
individual to take political action or become involved with an animal rights movement.
Such political action may lead to an intrinsic reward.
The purity foundation is often triggered by thoughts of religion and bodily
contamination. The purity foundation may be activated in many ways and triggers can
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vary greatly across cultures. This foundation can be tied to views toward immigration as
well as religious liberty. Immigration, specifically, can act as a trigger because it is often
seen as a threat to the purity of society and traditional social norms. For example, during
his campaign Republican President-elect Donald Trump described undocumented, Latino
immigrants as rapists, drug dealers, and murderers who are destroying American society
(Lee, 2015). This narrative, some argue, has been a driving force behind his support with
many white Americans (Haidt, 2012). Other triggers may be advertisements regarding
wounded warriors, global famine, and children in poverty. Haidt argues that because both
individualizing and binding foundations will produce moral emotions they can all serve
as political triggers (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Greene, 2002).
Figure 1:
Moral Judgement Process

Approach and Avoidance Moral Motives
The theory that inducing emotions will affect an individual’s moral sense suggests
that emotional responses can lead to the motivation for political involvement. Using
political advertisements appealing to moral sense will lead to an emotional response that
will drive moral judgments. The strength of these moral judgments can then determine
involvement. Janoff-Bulman and colleagues (2008) describe the distinction between
approach-avoidance motivations in morality. They describe four specific motives, two of
which could be considered approach motives and two of which could be considered
avoidance motives. Social justice is the first approach-based motive and involves the
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advancement of others and the social group by promoting equality and fairness for all
members. Self-reliance, the second approach-based motive, involves providing for the
self. Self-reliance is seen as benefiting the social group by reducing each individual’s
burden on the group. These are considered the approach motives because they focus on
the activation of the motivation to help oneself and others. Both self-reliance and social
justice motives are sensitive to intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. The behavioral activation
system of motivation is activated when individuals have a drive to approach behaviors
when those behaviors will result in a reward (Hopko, et al., 2004). For example,
individuals are likely to exhibit approach behaviors when a monetary or emotional
reward is involved. This is especially true since the reward may result in alleviating
negative emotions. Feelings of frustration, annoyance, and anger may be reduced when
behaviors result in a reward (Hopko, et al., 2004).
In contrast to the behavioral activation system, the behavioral inhibition system of
motivation is activated when individuals have a drive to avoid behaviors when those
behaviors will result in punishment. Self-restraint, the first avoidance-based motive,
focuses on avoiding negative outcomes. The self-restraint motive is best understood in
terms of self-protection and involves avoiding behaviors that may have a negative impact
one’s life. Social order is the second avoidance-based motive and involves resisting
threats to the social group and group cohesion. Desire for social order promotes
adherence to traditional values and norms and may have a negative impact on the group.
Consistent with the theory of the behavior inhibition system, avoidance motives involve
the inhibition motivations that are sensitive to punishment. This sensitivity to punishment
also leads to the avoidance of negative emotions. Receiving punishment may result in
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high activation emotions such as fear, anxiety, frustration, and stress. Avoiding
punishment may alleviate these emotions (Hopko, et al., 2004; Janoff-Bulman et al.,
2008).
In the case of moral motives, helping others may provide an emotional reward
that could evoke more approach behaviors. In contrast, deviating from social norms
results in punishment which could lead to more avoidance behaviors. This approachavoidance distinction is consistent with Haidt and colleagues’ theory on the five moral
foundations. Specifically, approach motives are most closely related to the
individualizing foundations because these foundations include issues of social justice,
harm, and fairness. Individuals may approach behaviors that lead to fairness and justice
while avoiding behaviors that would cause harm to others. The motivation to act on this
foundation can promote intrinsic rewards. Similarly, avoidance motives may be activated
by the binding foundations. These foundations include issues of group affiliation,
submission to authority, and adherence to traditional social norms. The motivation act on
these foundations can be driven by the desire to avoid social punishment.
The current study focuses on the harm foundation and social justice motives. The
harm foundation was chosen due to the relationship with social justice motives. Framing
the political issues in the context of harm was expected to act as a positive trigger to
induce social justice motives. The purity statements were also expected to offer a positive
view of issues, but were not expected to affect either approach or avoidance moral
motives. This is expected because the purity statements were positively framed. For
example, purity immigration statements spoke of immigrants’ lives being sacred while a
negative statement would refer to immigrants as polluting American culture. Were they
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framed negatively, they would be expected to have an effect such as increasing avoidance
motives. Rather, the purity statements were expected to support previous research and
served as the control condition for comparison.
Morality and Political Ideology
The current study also examines whether there are differences in moral
foundations and motivations between individuals with liberal and conservative identities.
Based on existing research examining the relationship between morality and political
ideology, it is expected that liberals and conservatives will have different moral
foundations and motivations. Several researchers have examined the relationships among
moral foundations, moral motives, and political ideology. In particular, the role of liberalconservative ideology has been examined in the context of the Western political
structure.
This role has been examined in the context of both moral foundations and
motivations. Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) examined the relationship between moral
foundations and political ideology in two studies. Study one suggested that liberals and
conservatives differed in which moral foundation they would consider to be relevant for
moral judgments. Conservatives found issues relevant to the binding foundations, such as
group cohesion and traditional values to be especially concerning, while participants
across the political spectrum found issues relevant to the individualizing foundations,
such as fairness and social justice, to be relevant to moral judgments (Graham, Haidt, &
Nosek, 2009). Study two suggested that liberals were more concerned with issues
relevant to harm and fairness, while conservatives were more concerned with authority,
purity, and benefits for the ingroup. Further, liberals were more likely to value the
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individualizing foundations over the binding foundations, while conservatives valued
both foundations somewhat equally (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).
In the context of the current political discourse, liberals may be more likely to
reject trade-offs involving marriage equality in the interest of social equality despite the
threat to traditional values. Conservatives, on the other hand, may be more likely to
accept trade-offs involving undocumented immigrants in the interest of fairness and harm
but not in the interest tradition, social order, and the purity of society. Together, the
results of all three of Graham, Haidt, and Nosek’s studies suggest that liberals and
conservatives act on different sets of moral foundations. Overall, liberals make a large
distinction between individualizing foundations and binding foundations while
conservative moral priorities appear to be somewhat consistent across the two types of
foundations.
Janoff-Bulman and colleagues (2008) further examined the relationship between
political ideology and morality. They found that conservatives were more likely to be
motived by concerns of self-restraint and social order while liberals were more likely to
be motivated by concerns of social justice. They also found that liberals and
conservatives were equally likely to be motivated by self-reliance concerns (JanoffBulman et al., 2008).
Overall, results show differences between liberals and conservatives when it
comes to both moral foundations and moral motives. Liberals tend to emphasize
individualizing foundations and approach motives. This pattern is consistent with prior
research showing that liberals are more concerned with issues involving social justice,
equality, and mutual benefit. In contrast, conservatives tend to emphasize binding

13
foundations of authority, ingroup, and purity and to endorse avoidant motives. However,
other research suggests that conservatives show no differences between the
individualizing and binding foundations (Graham, 2012; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;
Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Graham, 2008; Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008). These results show a
slight contradiction. Conservatives are likely to emphasize both individualizing and
binding foundations. However, they are less inclined to be motivated by social justice
concerns. Given that social justice motives are closely related to the individualizing
foundations, it seems possible to induce motivation toward social justice concerns by
framing political issues in the context of the individualizing foundations. Specifically,
framing political issues in the context of the harm foundation may induce the motivation
toward social justice concerns.
Framing Political Issues
Much attention has been given to the effects of framing on political
communication. The framing effect describes the ways in which the presentation of a
persuasive argument can have an effect on behavior and attitudes. Iyengar (1991)
described two types of political framing based on theory and empirical research.
Thematic frames focus on the broad context of an issue and are more likely to lead the
receiver to apply situational attributions. In contrast, episodic frames focus on a specific
individual instance that represents the issue and lead the receiver to apply dispositional
attributions. For example, a thematic frame would state that poverty is the result of low
wages and corporate greed while an episodic frame would state that poverty is the fault of
the individual (Iyengar, 1991; Nelson, 1997). Brewer and Gross (2005) argue that
because thematic frames present cues such as facts, statistics, and the broader context of

14
the issue presented, they rely less on emotional cues and more on the audience’s sense of
reason. Episodic frames, however, may provide cues in stories meant to induce emotional
responses and emphasize the human interest aspects of an issue (Brewer & Gross, 2005;
Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Iyengar, 1991). Gross (2008) examined emotional responses
and attitude change following exposure to episodic and thematic frames. Participants’
attitudes toward mandatory minimum sentencing were measured prior to exposure to one
of two vignettes: an episodic or a thematic frame. The episodic frame told a personal
story about the effects of mandatory minimum sentencing while the thematic frame gave
statistics related to mass incarceration. Episodic frames led to a more negative emotional
response and elicited more attitude change than the thematic frame (Brewer & Gross,
2005; Gross, 2008). This showed that framing political issues in a way that presents a
personal story that leads to an emotional response and promotes attitude change.
Day and colleagues (2014) expanded on the idea of episodic framing by
examining whether they influence political attitudes. The authors argued that political
attitudes are often grounded in beliefs about what is right and wrong, and suggested that
Haidt’s typology of moral foundations can be used to understand the attitudes of both
liberals and conservatives. Specifically, they examined whether framing political issues
in the context of the five moral foundations (fairness, harm, authority, ingroup, purity)
would influence political attitudes. The issues were presented without specific facts or
figures. Rather, consistent with episodic framing, the issues were presented in a single
statement meant to be personally relatable to the reader. This theory was tested by first
measuring participants’ attitudes toward five political issues and then presenting them
with five frames of both liberal and conservative political issues. Attitudes shifted after
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reading the frames, specifically when both liberals and conservatives received proattitudinal frames (regardless of the type of moral framing) their attitudes toward the
issues were strengthened. However, when conservatives were presented with counterattitudinal moral frames their attitudes were likely to become more liberal. In other
words, when conservatives were presented with liberal political issues their attitudes
became more liberal (Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014). These results offer insight
into the power of morality in influencing political attitudes.
Framing and Moral Motives
The purpose of this study is to examine whether framing political issues in the
context of the MFT harm foundation will cause a change in the social justice motives,
especially among conservatives. It is expected that, in comparison to liberals, the social
justice motives of conservatives will be affected by political issues framed with a focus
on avoiding harm to others. This hypothesis is consistent with research suggesting that
the behavioral activation system facilitates engagement in reward-seeking behaviors in an
effort to reduce negative emotions. The purity foundation will be used as the comparison
condition as it is not expected to affect social justice motives. Specifically, it is expected
that the purity frames will support prior results showing that liberals are motivated by
social justice while conservatives are not. Additionally, the current study examines
whether high-activation negative emotions mediate the relationship between harm
framing and social justice motives.
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The hypotheses are:
H1: In contrast to liberals, when political issues are framed to induce feelings of
harm, conservatives will be more motivated by concerns of social justice than when
issues are framed to induce feelings of purity.
H2: When political issues are framed to induce feelings of harm, both liberals and
conservatives will be more motivated by concerns of social justice than when
framed to induce feelings of purity.
H3: When political issues are framed to induce feelings of harm, both liberals and
conservatives will be motivated by concerns of social justice and negative high
activation emotions will mediate the relationship. This expected relationship is
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2:
Proposed Mediation Effect of High-Activation Negative Emotions on the Relationship
Between Harm Framing and Social Justice Motives

Note: Though not the theoretical focus of this study, high-activation positive emotions,
self-reliance, social order, and self-restraint will also be examined and tested in this
mediation model.
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Method
Participants
For this study, 355 United States citizens (60.3% female) were recruited through
Amazon Mechanical Turk (M Turk). The average age of participants was 37 (M = 36.56,
SD = 11.23). About 67% of participants reported a liberal political identity while 33%
reported being conservative. Demographics for each condition are shown in Table 1. The
purpose of recruiting through M Turk was to obtain a sample that includes a wide range
of ages and political views. They were compensated at the rate of $.75 for their 10
minutes of participation.
Table 1
Demographics by Condition
Condition (N)
Harm (N = 161)
Purity (N = 174)

Male
N
49
81

Female
N
111
91

Age
M (SD)
36.34 (11.59)
36.77 (10.92)

Liberal
N
110
113

Conservative
N
51
60

Procedure, Design, Stimuli, and Measures
The design of this study was a 2 (Moral Foundation) x 2 (Political Identity)
between subjects factorial design with the DVs of social justice, self-reliance, selfrestraint, and social order motives as well as negative high activation emotions. After
enrolling in the study through M Turk, participants were provided with the survey link
and asked to complete an online study administered through the Qualtrics survey
platform. Participants completed this study on their own time and in the location of their
choosing.
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To begin the study participants read an informed consent agreement. Upon
agreeing to the terms outlined in the informed consent statement, participants were
directed to begin the survey by clicking the arrow at the bottom of the page. Upon
completing the study, participants were presented with a debriefing statement and
thanked for their time.
Moral Foundations Priming Manipulation. First, participants were randomly
assigned to either the harm or purity moral foundation priming condition. Participants in
both conditions were presented with five political statements on the topics of
immigration, environment, economic market, social programs, and education. The
statements were used in Day and colleagues’ (2014) framing study. All of the primes
chosen included statements framed in a positive manner. Each frame presented a political
issue stated in the context of the harm or purity dimensions of moral foundations. These
statements were designed to serve as emotional moral triggers for the harm and the purity
foundations. Participants read each of the five statements. After reading each statement,
participants were asked to write two or three supporting sentences. The purpose of this
method of priming is to first expose the participants to five political issues and then to
lead them to consider the issues further and in depth.
The directions for the prompts stated: “Instructions: Your task is to help create
materials for future research on people’s opinions of current topics. First, you are asked
to provide good arguments that support positions on 5 current topics. Some positions
may be easier or more difficult to create supporting points for than others. We will check
your work so please try your best. We appreciate your help to create these materials for
future academic research.
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Please write 2 or 3 points that support the positions below in the space
provided. For example, provide statements about the benefits of this position or reasons
that support this position. The box will expand to allow for your statements.”
After reading the directions, participants were presented with the statements.
Participants assigned to the harm prompt read the following statements:
Immigration: All people, including immigrants, deserve to be protected from
harm.
Environment: We must care for the earth.
Economic Market: We must keep the free market from hurting everyday people.
Social Programs: Even poor people need society to care for them.
Education: We must care for our children by providing them all with a high
quality education.
Participants assigned to the purity prompt read the following primes:
Immigration: Immigrants’ lives are sacred, just like every other human.
Environment: We must keep the earth pure.
Market: We have to clean up the dirtied economic market.
Social Programs: Every human life is sacred, no matter how much money they
make.
Education: High quality public education cultivates or most sacred asset: our
children.
Manipulation check. As part of the manipulation, participants were first asked to
read five statements and write two to three supporting points for those statements.
Participants could not move forward with the survey without completing this task.
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Exclusion criteria for this task were determined a priori. Responses were examined to
determine whether the written responses corresponded with the statements. Participants
whose written responses were inconsistent with the statements were eliminated from the
final analyses. As a result, 19 participants were excluded and 335 participants were
included in the final analyses. Examples of excluded participants’ responses included:
Immigration: No
Environment: Who cares.
Market: It’s corrupt.
Social Programs: Lazy people.
Education: Who needs is.
Measure of High-Activation Negative Affect (Posner, Russell, and Peterson,
2005; Russell, 1980) Next, participants completed a survey based on the circumplex
model of affect. The purpose of this survey is to measure the extent to which the priming
exercise induced high-activation negative emotions. Participants were presented with
instructions stating: “This scale consists of a number of words that describe different
feelings and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the
space next to that word. Indicate the extent to which the statements you read caused you
to feel these emotions using the following scale:” They were presented with eight highactivation negative emotions, including tense, stressed, frustrated, angry, and asked to
rate the extent to which each word represents their feelings toward the statements using a
Likert scale of 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Scores were totaled and an
average for each participant was calculated with a higher score indicating a more
negative response. In order to account for missing data, an average score was computed
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allowing for the inclusion of participants who responded to at least seven of the eight
items in this measure. This resulted in no missing cases in the final analyses. Descriptive
statistics for this measure are presented in Table 1. Reliability for this measure was strong
with a Cronbach’s α of .86. See Appendix A for the full measure.
Moral Motives Scale (MMS) (Janoff-Bulman, Manning, & Sheikh, 2006). Next,
participants completed a 20-item measure of approach and avoidance moral motives.
Each subscale contained five items. Self-reliance (Cronbach’s α = .86) and social justice
(Cronbach’s α = .92) represented approach motives. An example of a self- reliance item
is “I’m willing to put the necessary time and effort into providing for my own well-being
and success.” An example of a social justice item is “We should all be responsible for
improving the welfare of others beyond our immediate circle of friends and family.” Selfrestraint (Cronbach’s α = .85) and social order (Cronbach’s α = .80) represented
avoidance motives. An example of a self-restraint item is “It’s particularly important to
me to demonstrate personal control in the face of temptation.” An example of a social
order item is “Giving people the freedom to choose the way they live threatens the
societal bonds that hold us together.” Participants rated the extent to which they agree or
disagree with each statement using a 7-point Likert-type scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to
7 (Strongly Agree). An average score was calculated for each subscale. A higher score in
each subscale indicated that the individual is likely to be currently experiencing that
motive. In order to account for missing data, an average score for each subdomain was
computed allowing for the inclusion of participants who responded to at least four of the
five items in this measure. This resulted in no missing cases in the self-restraint, social
order, and self-reliance subdomains. However, one case was eliminated from the social
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justice domain. Descriptive statistics for each subscale in this measure are presented in
Table 1. See Appendix B for the full measure.
Political Identity. Next, participants were asked to report whether they would
consider themselves to be liberal, conservative, moderate, or if they didn’t know. If
participants choose moderate or don’t know they were directed to the statement: “If you
had to choose one or the other, would you consider yourself to be:” and forced to choose
either liberal or conservative. Participants were asked to self-identify as either liberal,
conservative, moderate, or not sure. Those who responded as moderate or not sure were
directed to an item that forced them to choose either liberal or conservative. As a result, a
total of 97 participants were directed to the forced-choice item. Sixty-eight of the
participants chose liberal while 29 chose conservative. No data were eliminated due to
this process.
Demographic information. In addition, participants were asked to provide the
following demographic information: age, gender, religious denomination (if applicable),
and state of residence.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for Measured Variables
Measured Variable

N

Social Justice
Self-Reliance
Self-Restraint
Social Order
High-Activation Negative
Emotions

334
335
335
335
335

Minimum
Value
1.00
2.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

Maximum
Value
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
5.00

Mean
5.15
6.00
5.35
3.09
1.98

Standard
Deviation
1.31
0.83
1.04
1.34
0.82
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Results
Data Preparation
Violations of Assumptions. Prior to analyses, the data were examined to
determine whether there were any serious violations of assumptions that should be met.
With the exception of the measure of high-activation negative emotions, all data were
normally distributed with no outliers. The data for high activation negative emotions
showed an extreme positive skew. Although natural logarithmic transformation showed
some improvement in this distribution, the data remained positively skewed. The results
presented in subsequent sections were conducted both using the original metric and using
the natural logarithmic transformed data. Because the results were the same, only the raw
analyses are presented in this thesis
Data Analysis
Social Justice. In order to test the prediction that conservatives would be more
motivated by social justice concerns when harm associations are induced than when
purity concerns are induced, a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was performed. Results
showed a statistically significant interaction of framing and political identity on socialjustice motives, F(1, 333) = 83.51, MSE = .911, p < .001, partial η2 = .202. This
interaction is illustrated in Figure 3. Simple effects indicated statistically significant
effects of framing among those with a conservative identity, F(1, 111) = 190.35, p < .001,
partial η2 = .636, but not those with a liberal identity, F(1, 222) = .318, MSE = .332, p =
.573, partial η2 = .001. Group means suggest that conservatives in the harm condition
reported stronger social justice motives than conservatives in the purity condition, while
framing did not affect social justice motives for liberals.
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To test the prediction that participants would be more motivated by social justice
concerns when harm associations were induced than when purity associations were
induced, main effects were examined. Participants in the harm condition (M = 5.56, SD=
1.02) reported higher levels of social justice motives than those in the purity condition (M
= 4.76, SD = 1.43), F(1,333) = 96.71, MSE = .911, p < .001, partial η2 = .227.
Cell/Marginal means and standard deviations, interactions, and main effects results are
shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
Self-Reliance. Although no difference between conservatives’ and liberals’
motivation over self-reliance concerns was expected, a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA
was performed. Results showed no interaction between framing and political identity in
predicting self-reliance motives. There was no main effect of framing or political identity
on self-reliance motives. Cell/Marginal means and standard deviations, interaction, and
main effects results are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
Social-Order. To test the prediction that conservatives would be more motivated
by social order concerns than liberals, a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was performed.
Results showed no statistically significant interaction between framing and political
identity in predicting social order motives. However, conservatives (M = 3.61, SD = 1.32)
reported higher levels of social order motives than liberals (M = 2.83, SD = 1.28), F(1,
333) = 28.14, MSE = 46.37, p < .001, partial η2 = .08. There was no main effect of
framing on social-order motives. Cell/Marginal means and standard deviations,
interaction, and main effects results are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
Self-Restraint. To test the prediction that conservatives would be more motivated
by self-restraint concerns than liberals, a 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was performed.
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There was no statistically significant interaction between framing and political identity on
self-restraint motives. Results showed that conservatives (M = 5.69, SD = 0.95) reported
higher levels of self-restraint than liberals (M = 5.17, SD = 1.03), F(1, 333) = 20.377,
MSE = 20.582, p < .001, partial η2 = .058. Cell/Marginal means and standard deviations,
interaction, and main effects results are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
High-Activation Negative Emotions. To test the prediction that negative highactivation emotions would mediate the relationship between harm associations and social
justice motives analyses were performed using the SPSS Hayes Process Model 4. A
dummy variable was computed (0 = Harm, 1 = Purity) to include the priming
manipulation in regression analysis. First, correlations were computed among all
variables and are shown in Table 6. Results showed a statistically significant positive
correlation between harm and social justice motives, r = .307, p < .01. Consistent with
the ANOVA results, those in the harm condition reported higher levels of social justice
motives than in the purity condition. However, since there were no correlations between
harm and high-activation negative emotions (r = -.043) or between high activation
negative emotions and social justice (r = .036), no further mediation analyses were
performed.
To further explore the role of high activation emotions, a 2 x 2 between-subjects
ANOVA was performed. Results showed no significant interaction between framing
condition and political identity in predicting an emotional reaction. Additionally, there
were no significant main effects of framing condition or political identity in predicting an
emotional reaction. Cell/Marginal means and standard deviations, interactions, and main
effects are shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5.
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Gender Differences. To examine the influence of gender on social justice
motives, a 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA including gender as a third condition was
performed. There was no statistically significant interaction, F(1, 333) = 1.51, MSE =
0.92, p = .201, partial η2 = .005. Additionally, there was no statistically significant main
effect of gender, F(1,333) = .561, MSE = 0.92, partial η2 = .002.
Summary
Overall, results showed a statistically significant interaction of condition and
political identity predicted social justice motives. When primed to make harm
associations, conservatives reported higher levels of social justice motives than when
primed with purity. However, liberals responded similarly to the harm and purity primes.
Results also showed statistically significant differences in self-reliance, social justice,
social order, and self-restraint motives as a function of political identity. Conservatives
reported more endorsement of self-reliance, social order, and self-restraint motives than
liberals. Liberals reported higher levels of social justice motives than conservatives.
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Figure 3
Interaction Between Political Identity and Harm/Purity

Table 3
Cell Means and Standard Deviations for Factorial Analysis
Conservative
Harm
N = 51
Dependent Variable
Social Justice
Self-Reliance
Social Order
Self-Restraint
High-Activation
Negative Emotions

M
5.36
6.14
3.63
5.76
1.94

SD
0.80
0.71
1.37
0.94
0.86

Liberal

Purity
N = 60
M
3.25
6.09
3.61
5.64
1.86

SD
0.80
0.84
1.28
0.96
0.86

Harm
N = 110
M
5.66
6.01
2.64
5.27
1.94

SD
1.10
0.99
1.31
1.09
0.69

Purity
N = 112
M
5.58
5.88
3.02
5.08
2.09

SD
0.94
0.70
1.22
0.97
0.88
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Table 4
Marginal Means and Standard Deviations for Factorial Analysis
Dependent Variable

Liberal
Conservative
M (SD)
M (SD)
5.62 (1.01)
4.22 (1.32)
2.83 (1.28)
3.62 (1.32)
2.83 (1.28)
3.62 (1.32)
5.17 (1.03)
5.69 (0.95)
2.02 (0.79)
1.89 (0.86)

Social Justice
Self-Reliance
Social Order
Self-Restraint
High-Activation Negative
Emotions

Harm
M (SD)
5.56 (1.02)
2.95 (1.41)
2.95 (1.41)
5.42 (1.07)
1.94 (0.75)

Purity
M (SD)
4.77 (1.43)
3.22 (1.27)
3.22 (1.27)
5.27 (1.00)
2.01 (0.88)

Table 5
Interaction and Main Effects of Condition and Political Identity on Moral Motives and
High-Activation Negative Emotions

Condition
Dependent Variable
F
96.71
Social Justice
.889
Self-Reliance
1.41
Social Order
1.86
Self-Restraint
High-Activation
.133
Negative Emotions
Note: Sig. = Significant at .05

Identity

Condition*Identity

Sig.

η2

F

Sig.

η2

F

Sig.

η2

.000
.346
.237
.174

.227
.003
.004
.006

140.27
3.18
28.14
20.38

.000
.076
.000
.000

.299
.010
.079
.058

83.51
.198
1.86
.065

.000
.657
.174
.799

.202
.001
.006
.000

.716

.000

1.587

.209

.005

1.474 .226

.004
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Table 6
Correlations Among Harm Framing, High-Activation Negative Emotions, and Moral
Motives
Social
Justice

SelfReliance

Social
Justice
Self.218**
Reliance
Self.079
.565**
Restraint
Social Order
-.243**
-.192**
Affect
.036
.098
Harm
-.307**
.057
Note: ** = Significant at .01 (2-tailed)

SelfRestraint

.188**
-.051
.069

Social
Order

.098
-.102

Affect

Harm

-.043

Discussion
The current study examined whether framing political issues to induce feelings of
causing or avoiding harm would have an effect on social justice moral motives.
Specifically, this study examined whether framing could increase social justice motives
in conservatives. This research suggested that conservatives reported stronger social
justice motives when political issues were framed to induce feelings of causing or
avoiding harm while liberals reported strong social justice motives regardless of framing.
This supports the first hypothesis and suggests that when political issues are framed in the
context of harm, conservatives were more motivated by social justice concerns than when
framed in the context of purity. Further, social justice motives were induced to a greater
extent by framing issues in the context of harm than by purity. Although the harm
framing was effective among conservatives it was not consistent for liberals and
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conservatives. Overall, liberals reported stronger social justice motives than
conservatives.
Day and colleagues (2014) similarly found that political attitudes could be
affected by framing. They showed that framing political issues in the context of moral
foundations theory led to a change in attitudes about the issues. Specifically,
conservatives’ attitudes could become more liberal when political issues were framed in
the context of harm, fairness, authority, ingroup, and purity (Day, et al., 2014). The
results of the current study suggest that moral motives can be affected by framing. Moral
motives theory suggests that conservatives will not be motivated by social justice
concerns. However, current results suggest that when conservatives are presented issues
using the word “harm” or “care” as opposed to “purity” or “sanctity” they report more
concern for social justice.
The differences between conservatives’ and liberals’ social justice, social order,
and self-restraint motives supported previous research. Janoff-Bulmann and colleagues
(2008) found that while conservatives showed stronger motivation toward social order
and self-restraint, liberals showed stronger motivation toward social justice, and that they
equally show motivation toward self-reliance (Janoff-Bulmann, et al., 2008). The current
results are consistent with these previous findings. Conservatives showed stronger
motivation toward social order and self-restraint while liberals showed more motivation
toward social justice. This was true regardless of how political issues were framed.
There was no support for the hypothesis that a negative emotional response to the
harm framing would affect social justice motives. Results suggest that the priming
exercise failed to elicit high-activation negative emotions in either the harm or purity
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condition. This result is in contrast with previous research examining the effects of
framing on emotional response. Gross (2008) found that episodic framing of political
issues could induce an emotional response and that a stronger emotional response led to a
change in attitudes toward mandatory minimum sentencing for drug convictions. When
the framing led to a strong emotional response, attitudes toward sentencing became more
negative (Gross, 2008). The current research also contrasts with previous research
suggesting that emotional responses form the basis for moral judgments. For example,
Bloom (2014) found that when harm or disgust associations were induced, individuals
who experienced strong self- or other-directed negative emotions made harsher
judgments about moral issues (Bloom, 2014).
Previous framing research (Bloom, 2014; Gross, 2008; Iyengar, 1991) has relied
on the use of vignettes to induce emotions. These vignettes used relatable, personal
stories that provided emotional cues. The current study instead relied on a set of political
issue statements and the consideration of supporting statements. The issues of
immigration, the environment, and the economy were very divisive in the 2016
Presidential election. This could be seen at rallies, on cable news, and on social media. It
was assumed that the emotional nature of US politics would be sufficient to stir emotions.
Presenting political issues in single statements and forcing the consideration of
supporting statements was not effective in causing an emotional response.
Previous research suggests that emotions play a central role in moral sense and
political attitudes (Bloom, 2014; Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 2012; Marazetti, et al., 2013) and
Hume’s (1738/1978) first ethical thesis stated that reason alone cannot act as a motive.
While most theories of moral reasoning suggest that emotion is the basis of decisions, the
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current results suggest otherwise. While the framing method of the current study may not
have been effective, perhaps the role of emotions is not as strong as previously believed.
It could be that reason is more powerful and that emotions are merely an artifact of
reason.
While the role of emotion in motivation was not supported, overall results support
both prior research and the current hypotheses. The priming exercise did not induce an
emotional reaction but did induce social justice motives. Framing political issues under
the framework of moral foundations theory had a strong effect on social justice motives.
When primed to consider political issues in the context of causing harm, conservatives
showed more concern for social justice than when primed to consider purity. This is
consistent with prior theories suggesting that moral sense is derived from the innate and
universal motivation to avoid causing harm to others (Marazzeti, et al., 2014; Turiel,
1983).
When political issues were framed in the context of purity there were no effects
on moral motives. Purity is mostly considered in the context of social issues such as
women’s, minority, and LGBT rights or religious freedom. Disgust is the emotion most
related to purity. (Bloom, 2014; Haidt, 2012). Since the purity framing presented positive
statements and avoided social issues, it was not expected to lead to feelings of disgust.
Rather, it was expected that the purity framing would support previous research (Haidt,
2012; Janoff-Bulman, 2008) suggesting that there are differences in the moral
foundations and motives of conservatives and liberals. The lack of purity framing effects
on moral motives supported previous findings.
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The effectiveness of framing political issues in the context of causing or avoiding
harm could be an important consideration when devising communication strategy. When
individuals are encouraged to consider whether a political issue or public policy causes
harm to others, changes in moral motivation can occur. When immigration,
environmental, education, or economic policies are framed to highlight the harm they will
cause, individuals may show more concern for social justice. For example, if the issue of
mass deportation of undocumented immigrants as described by President-elect Donald
Trump (Lee, 2015) was instead framed to show the harm that such a policy would cause
to families and communities, social justice motives could be induced. Inducing social
justice motives could promote a change in moral motives and political attitudes toward
immigration.
While previous research suggests that framing can influence both political and
consumer attitudes (Gross, 2008; Iyengar, 1991; Nelson, 1997), the question remains
whether influencing attitudes is enough to affect behavior. If framing can go further and
not only change attitudes but also motivation, this could lead to a greater level of
behavioral change. If behavioral change is the ultimate goal of political framing, perhaps
the application of the MFT framework to political messaging could be an effective
strategy. Overall, the current results suggest that morality could be an important
consideration in framing political issues. Appealing to individuals’ sense of causing or
avoiding harm could be an effective means of framing political issues in a way that leads
to positive changes in political attitudes.
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Limitations and Future Directions
This study has a number of limitations that if properly addressed could improve
future research on framing and moral motives. The first limitation is in the design of the
priming method. As mentioned earlier, this study relied on single statements about five
different political issues. Future research could instead make use of vignettes in which a
political issue is framed under the MFT framework. For example, future research might
incorporate Gross’ (2008) use of episodic framing. Framing an issue in episodically in the
context of causing or avoiding harm would likely not only induce social justice motives
but also emotions. This method would more consistent with real-world situations and
offer stronger external validity since political issues are not typically discussed using
single statements. Instead, political issues are framed in speeches, prepared remarks,
television ads, or social media posts, among others. Presenting political issues in a format
consistent with the ways individuals receive political information could evoke emotions
and provide a better test of their role in mediating the relationship between harm framing
and social justice motives.
Another consideration when considering the role of emotions is the focus on
negative emotions. Though the circumplex model includes both negative and positive
emotions, the current research focused on the negative. This was due to the negative
nature of politics. Since the statements in the priming manipulation were positively
framed, perhaps high-activation positive emotions promote social justice motives.
A second limitation is the method used to determine political identity. Those who
reported being moderate or unsure were forced to choose either liberal or conservative.
Feldman and Johnston (2014) found that political identity was not necessarily consistent
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with political ideology. They argue that a unidimensional model of ideology is
insufficient in determining political identity because those who identify as conservative
often have liberal social attitudes. Those who identify as liberal may have conservative
economic attitudes. They used advanced factor modeling to place individuals into three
latent classes. Each class showed differences in how ideology is linked to identity
(Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Future research could consider this type of method to more
accurately measure political identity. A simpler option is to include those who identify as
moderate or unsure as levels of the political identity variable.
A third limitation is in the use of a 2 x 2 ANOVA. While the analyses did yield
statistically significant results, a pretest measure of moral motives would provide a more
powerful test. Random assignment does equalize individual differences in the sample,
however, having a baseline measure of moral motives for all participants would assure all
groups were equal prior to exposure to the stimuli.
Conclusions
The current study examined whether framing political issues to induce feelings of
harm would have an effect on moral motives. When political issues were framed to
induce feelings of harm, conservatives showed more motivation toward social justice
than when framed to induce feelings of purity. This suggests that framing a political issue
in the context of causing or avoiding harm can cause conservatives’ motivation toward
social justice to be increased.
These results could be an important consideration when developing
communication, media, and public relations strategies, especially in the current political
climate in the United States. Liberal political views tend to focus on issues of fairness and
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social justice, however, liberal messaging often relies on thematic framing (Gross, 2008).
Episodic framing has been shown to be effective in changing political attitudes.
Presenting issues of social justice episodically and in the context of causing harm to
others may be a more effective method of messaging. Specifically, presenting a message
focused on harm could lead conservatives to focus less on social order and self-restraint
and more on social justice. Stronger motivation toward social justice issues could lead to
positive changes in attitudes toward a number of political issues.
While Gross (2008), Haidt (2012), and Bloom (2014) suggest that emotions can
be a basis of moral judgements and can lead to changes in motivation and political
attitudes, the current results are contradictory. High activation negative emotions played
no role in the change in social justice motives among conservatives. The current results
suggest that emotions played no role in the relationship between how issues are framed
and changes in moral motivation in general. This suggests that perhaps the relationship
between emotions and morality may be weaker than previously thought.
The overall purpose of the current research was to show that there may be a more
effective means of presenting political issues. The current state of political discourse is
steeped in negative, fearful rhetoric. Both liberals and conservatives are guilty of
presenting political issues in a way meant to stoke fear, anger, and anxiety. The result is a
hyper-divisive state of political discourse. If the goal of politics is to sway attitudes,
perhaps politicians and pundits, as well as citizens, should focus on rhetoric that removes
ideology from the debate and frames political issues in a more positive manner.
Removing typical ideological talking points from the discussion and focusing on the realworld effects of policies could lead to less political confrontation. Removing negative
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language and, instead, framing political issues in a positive manner that appeals to
individuals’ sense of morality could influence motives while changing the discourse. The
current research suggests that this method of communication could be the first step in
changing the nature of American politics.
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Appendix A
Measure of Emotional Responses (Russell, 1980; Posner, Russell, and Peterson, 2005)
Instructions: This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings
and emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to
that word. Indicate the extent to which the political statements you read and your written
response caused you to feel these emotions using the following scale:
1 = Very Slightly or Not at All
2 = A Little
3 = Moderately
4 = Quite a Bit
5 = Extremely

____Tense

____Nervous

____Stressed

____Upset

____Frustrated

____Annoyed

____Alarmed

____Afraid
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Appendix B
Moral Motives Scale (Janoff-Bulman, Manning, & Sheikh, 2006)
Directions: Please indicate the extent to which you disagree or agree with the following
statements using the following scale: 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree.
1. It’s particularly important to me to demonstrate self-control in the face of temptation.
2. We should all be responsible for improving the welfare of others beyond our
immediate circle of friends and family.
3. Giving people the freedom to choose the way they live threatens the societal bonds that
hold us together.
4. I’m willing to put the necessary time and effort into providing for my own well-being
and success.
5. It’s an obligation, not a matter of personal preference, to provide for people worse off
even if we’re not close to them.
6. I value hard work and personal commitment when it comes to making decisions in my
life.
7. People should not be completely free to express themselves through their own choice
of lifestyle, even if they don’t harm others.
8. When things get tough, I apply myself and work even harder to overcome difficulties.
9. Self-discipline in the lifestyle I choose is an important way for me to feel like a decent
person.
10. It’s important for those who are better off in society to work hard to provide more
resources for those who are worse off.
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11. By bucking tradition and choosing new lifestyles, people are actually threatening the
wider society.
12. I demonstrate I’m a better person every time I exercise self-restraint rather than
giving in to my desires.
13. I think it’s important to take responsibility for my failures and setbacks rather than
blame other people.
14. It’s not always easy to avoid temptations, but for my own good I feel I really have to
try my best.
15. If we look after ourselves, we still need to look after others in society.
16. Whether or not I have others to lean on, I think it’s important for me to provide for
myself.
17. When we try to get people to abide by our own code of behavior, we are not invading
other people’s privacy and right to choose for themselves.
18. In the healthiest societies those at the top feel responsible for providing better lives
for those at the bottom.
19. Life is full of unhealthy attractions, so it’s important for me to develop a strong sense
of self-discipline and control.
20. In a decent society, people should not be free to make their own choices about how to
live their lives, but should attend to community standards.

